Chart of the Month: Does the Traditional Fund of Funds Model Still Have a Future?

does the traditional fund of funDs model still have a future?

Comparison of equity long/short strategy performance versus fund of funds peers and the Barclays Multi-PM Equity Index over four years. — Comparison of equity long/short strategy performance versus equity fund of funds peers index and the Barclays Multi-PM Equity Index over four years.

As a firm, NS Partners has been involved in managing fund of hedge funds strategies for almost 57 years. Back in the 1990s, almost every private bank in Switzerland managed its own fund of funds for clients. At the time, it was relatively easy to generate double-digit returns: there were fewer hedge funds (and therefore less competition), while regulation remained light. The introduction of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) in 2000 marked the end of the “fast money” era.

Given their success, many fund of funds became too large and suffered from the classic “diworsification” syndrome, which subsequently led to sub-par returns. Fast forward to today and most traditional fund of funds have disappeared, having largely been cannibalized by pod shops. The liquidation of Leverage Capital Holdings, one of the world’s oldest hedge fund of funds, in 2025 is a sign of the times.

Today, most investors have gravitated towards the multi-strategy pod-shop model, which has proven more efficient at allocating capital and cutting losses, despite being significantly more expensive than the traditional fund of funds approach. Others have turned to tailored hedge fund solutions offered by private banks.

With hedge fund assets at an all-time high, the number of new fund launches has steadily declined over the last 20 years. This highlights how the billion-dollar club of hedge funds continues to grow, attracting an ever-increasing share of industry assets.

As we all know, performance is typically inversely correlated with growth in assets under management. More importantly, the strongest portion of a manager’s track record is often generated during the first three to five years after inception—the very period before most institutional investors are willing to allocate capital.

At NS Partners, we have a long and proven history of backing hedge fund managers in their early innings, particularly in the equity long/short space. This has enabled us to build strong partnerships over time, often resulting in capacity rights, preferential fees and attractive liquidity terms. As a result, a concentrated fund of funds strategy can remain highly competitive compared with alternative hedge fund structures.

It is worth remembering that George Soros launched the Quantum Fund with a 1% management fee and a 10% performance fee. Somehow, 2%/20%—and often considerably more once pass-through costs are included—became the industry norm.

This month’s chart illustrates the performance of our equity long/short strategy over the last four years versus the average equity long/short fund of funds and the Barclays Multi-PM Equity Index over the same period.

So What Options Are Left in Today’s World of Hedge Fund Alternatives?

The Advisory Mandate

Buy high and sell low (everyone chases past performance—that’s human nature), making underperformance versus a concentrated fund of funds strategy highly likely.
Access to the best talent is often limited by capacity constraints.
Rarely invests alongside managers at an early stage.
Layered fee structures.

The Pod-Shop Model

Attractive risk-adjusted returns, although the most successful platforms are often capacity constrained.
Significant use of leverage, sometimes excessive.
Large numbers of underlying portfolio managers (often 100+) with the strongest contributors becoming less scalable over time.
Factor hedging can be detrimental to performance, particularly over the last two years.
High barriers to exit through both investor- and fund-level gates.
End investors can surrender more than 55% of gross performance through pass-through cost structures.
Often exposed to pod deleveraging events that can impair performance.

The Quant-Shop Model

High turnover and short investment horizons (from intraday to approximately 30 days), which have benefited recent performance.
Constant need to reinvent investment signals due to crowding and signal decay.
Frequently employs even more leverage than pod shops.
Investors rarely know precisely when or why losses occur (e.g., the “Quant Winter” from 2018 to 2020).
Relies primarily on algorithms with limited human intervention.

The Traditional Directional Fund of Funds Strategy

Low-cost, high-conviction portfolio of managers (12 remains the lucky number).
Backs managers before they reach the pinnacle of their careers.
Provides access to managers whose minimum investment requirements often range from USD 1 million to USD 25 million.
Liquid, with no investor-level gates that can delay capital returns for years.
Uses less leverage.
Highly difficult to replicate through an advisory mandate.

With pod shops and quant shops dominating market share today, perhaps it is time to revisit a less crowded and more focused fund of funds approach—one built around capacity-constrained managers with longer investment horizons.

The old-school approach of making directional equity bets with conviction, accepting that difficult years are inevitable, and relying on a disciplined long-term investment horizon may ultimately prove more rewarding than chasing year-to-date performance. Every strategy experiences setbacks, but a well-constructed short book can provide valuable protection along the way.

Beat Notz, our founding partner, is often quoted in research pieces published by Gavekal, a business he backed in the 1970s when it was known as Cecogest and was founded by Charles Gave:

Remember, it’s an easy business. When things get complicated, and markets are all over the place, just bear in mind that the Fed will always follow policies that benefit equity holders, because everyone in the US owns equities, and the Bundesbank will always follow policies that benefit bund holders, because everyone in Germany owns bunds. So, when markets are panicking and you don’t know what to do, just buy equities in the US and buy bunds in Germany.

Although bunds no longer exist, he was right about equities.

Written by CARON BASTIANPILLAI

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This content is provided for information purposes only and does not constitute investment advice, an offer, solicitation or recommendation to buy or sell any financial instrument or investment product.

The views and opinions expressed are those of NS PARTNERS SA at the date of publication and may change without notice. References to specific securities, sectors or market developments are provided for illustrative purposes only and should not be interpreted as investment recommendations or investment research.

Past performance does not predict future returns. The value of investments and the income derived from them may fluctuate and investors may not recover the amount originally invested. Investments involve risks, including possible loss of capital.

References to market indices, benchmarks or other measures of relative market performance are provided for information purposes only. NS PARTNERS SA makes reasonable efforts to ensure the accuracy of the information contained herein but provides no warranty or representation as to its completeness or accuracy.

Some entities of the NS Partners Group or their clients may hold positions in the financial instruments mentioned or may act as advisor to related issuers.

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Chart of the month: From Pod-Shop to Quant-Shop – The new El Dorado?

From Pod-Shop to Quant-Shop – The new El Dorado?

From pod-shop to quant-shop - the new El DOrado? Source: NS Partners, Bloomberg

Most of our readers will be familiar with the numerous pieces we have written over the last five years on the pod-shop model which have made both investors and investment managers very happy over the last two decades, with their performance culminating in 2024, one of the best years in recent history besides 2020 (read our piece back in January of this year: Peak Pod Shop – Where to Next?). Fast forward to today and performance in 2025 so far has proved to be challenging for most of them given the current risk-free rate. The Good, the Bad and the Ugly side of the pod-shop model has been increasingly highlighted by the press in recent months and pension funds amongst others are starting to shy away from this model as most still focus on total expense ratios (despite the superior risk adjusted returns of the past). Egregious fees (via the infamous passthrough model), poaching games on star traders (via creative enticement programs), the higher cost of leverage, significant market share of the overall hedge fund industry (and even more so in terms of global market footprint and impact when you include their leverage) and correlation between them are some of the common criticisms. YTD it is fair to say that most pod shops have disappointed investors (particularly in the market neutral US equity long / short space) in a market that has witnessed lots of turmoil during the first quarter and have barely recovered since then. Add to that the reluctance in applying a risk-free rate hurdle to performance fees charged and you will have a backlash on pod-shops that don’t deliver. The subsequent problem with that is where does one redeploy such large amounts of money despite the quarterly investor level gates that are increasingly being raised as assets balloon.

Since the “Quant Winter” between 2018 and 2020, quant funds have been performing with consistency, which has not gone unnoticed. As a result, they have been very successful in significantly raising assets this year, propelling some of the largest quant shops to the top of the Global Billion Dollar Club. They offer lower expense ratios (unlike the high passthrough structures for hiring talented traders), better liquidity (with no investor level gate for the most part), AND the client does not take the netting risk. From fundamental, technical, flow and sentiment driven signals, quant funds come in different garden varieties, and they all work until they don’t, and you never know when or why until after the event. One must not forget August 2007, which was a memorable moment for quant funds where the last one standing in the game of musical chairs was the winner-take-all! We did witness somewhat of a repeat this July, although with less drama (mostly due to short squeezes and factor rotations) but overall, they have demonstrated consistency in outperforming traditional pod shops.

Quantitative strategies take out the emotional factor in investment decisions (more rational and consistent decision making) however there are certain instances where quant shops can get blindsided by unpredictable events. “Liberation Day” was the latest example where many were caught off guard. Quant shops typically do not fare well during macro or geopolitical events. Sentiment is also another important factor to which many have had to adopt. Over the last five years quant shops have been increasing the use of AI and LLMs at an exponential rate and now seeking new ways in achieving machine “superintelligence”. Add to that the increasing availability of a plethora of new data sets and you have models that have become increasingly sophisticated and hard to compete with. The main drawback remains the fact that these models cannot plan for unexpected events or reasons like human beings. Perhaps the combination of quant strategies with a discretionary overlay or vice versa is the optimal solution going forward. DE Shaw, one of the oldest quant shops, just launched its first new multi-strategy fund in 15 years which will be running discretionary strategies instead of the algorithms they are historically known for. This trend is likely to continue.

With the average holding period for US stocks having declined significantly from over 5 years back in the 1970s to less than a few months today, this trend has somewhat been amplified by the pod-shops given the strict drawdown limits imposed on their PMs who typically trade over a quarter trying the anticipate the next earnings miss or beat. Quant shops have an even shorter time horizon ranging from nanoseconds (in the case of co-location) to 20 days or more and have thus further increased this trend. Gone are the traditional hedge funds that buy and hold over a long-time horizon whilst stomaching short term volatility. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why the daily trading volumes on the NYSE have consistently been beating records which have been approaching 5 trillion shares in a single day! Fair to say that today what you see on publicly available data is only the tip of the iceberg as most of the very large (and levered pod/quant shops) have their own internal liquidity provision whereby up to a third of their trades are matched internally therefore avoiding transaction costs and thus don’t appear in the official data. At the end of the day, it is a balance sheet exercise where both pod shop and quant shops manage thousands of underlying positions with a lot of leverage centered around a select number of prime brokers if not one (to offset trades internally when they can).

Whilst it is hard to gauge the total market share of the global hedge fund industry represented by pod shops and quant funds today (from the 25-30% of total AUM in 2024), one thing for sure is that given the leverage involved, the risk of getting run over remains very high given the recent growth in the quant space.

Past performance is not indicative of future results. The views, strategies and financial instruments described in this document may not be suitable for all investors. Opinions expressed are current opinions as of date(s) appearing in this material only. References to market or composite indices, benchmarks or other measures of relative market performance over a specified period of time are provided for your information only. NS Partners provides no warranty and makes no representation of any kind whatsoever regarding the accuracy and completeness of any data, including financial market data, quotes, research notes or other financial instrument referred to in this document. This document does not constitute an offer or solicitation to any person in any jurisdiction in which such offer or solicitation is not authorized or to any person to whom it would be unlawful to make such offer or solicitation. Any reference in this document to specific securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be interpreted as recommendations to purchase or sell those securities. References in this document to investment funds that have not been registered with the FINMA cannot be distributed in or from Switzerland except to certain categories of eligible investors. Some of the entities of the NS Partners Group or its clients may hold a position in the financial instruments of any issuer discussed herein, or act as advisor to any such issuer. Additional information is available on request.
© NS Partners Group

Last one standing – Reconsider European equity long short funds – NS Insights

European equity long short funds have suffered from Europe’s lack of appeal. But now might be the time to reconsider them.

At the beginning of the 2000s, most private banks and asset management firms based in Geneva managed their own funds of funds that invested in a new generation of young alternative managers specialising in European equity long/short strategies. At the time, these multi-manager funds delivered double-digit annualised returns, net of management and performance fees. After starting their careers as equity managers within large traditional investment companies, most of these talents left in the 1990s to establish their own independent asset management firms. Many of them were backed by alternative investment legends such as George Soros and Michael Steinhardt, to run portfolios of long/short equity ideas in Europe, a strategy that had already proven its worth in the United States since the 1950s.

An endangered species?

Today, all European funds of funds specialising in long/short equity have disappeared, with one exception. The main reason: the 2008 global financial crisis wiped out many hedge funds in Europe, partly because they offered more attractive liquidity terms than their American counterparts. Added to this, the US equity market has significantly outperformed Europe since 2009 (thanks to the tech sector), following a similar trend from 1989 to 2009, which further reduced the appeal of European equities. Moreover, Europe has been weakened by geopolitical challenges, making it even less attractive to international investors.

Investors have short memories

Yet it is well known that every crisis also presents significant opportunities for long/short managers. Many have already forgotten the Greek debt crisis at the end of 2009 and, more importantly, the country’s remarkable recovery after the 2018 bailout! This year, Greece ranks among the best-performing equity markets in the world, alongside other so-called peripheral markets like Poland, the Czech Republic, Spain and Italy, while Switzerland has lagged, moving similarly to France since the start of the year.

Make Europe Great Again

Published at the end of 2024, the Draghi report provided European leaders with a roadmap to “make Europe great again” by boosting investment and productivity. The report highlighted the need to invest EUR900 billion annually (around 4.5% of EU GDP) to address the continent’s structural competitiveness gap. This year, Germany announced a EUR500 billion plan over ten years to modernize its infrastructure. More recently, Blackstone unveiled plans to invest USD500 billion in Europe over the next decade. And this is just the tip of the iceberg, with many other initiatives underway across the continent to strengthen its competitiveness.

Europe is home to some of the world’s best companies

While Europe certainly has its share of struggling companies, it is also home to some of the most successful firms globally in luxury, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, energy, defense, and aerospace, all ideal playing fields for long/short strategies. Despite this, the universe of European long/short managers has been shrinking every year since the 2008 financial crisis, due to a lack of interest or liquidity compared to the US. Nevertheless, on a regional basis, managers focused on Europe have been among the top performers since the start of the year.

High potential but hard to access

History shows that the US has long produced some of the best long/short managers. However, over the past five years, some of the brightest talents in this space are found in Europe. They have managed to generate positive alpha on both their long and short positions, while skillfully adjusting their net exposure, an advantage often linked to the smaller size of their funds. Still, the capacity of these strategies remains limited due to low scalability tied to liquidity, restricting access to these opportunities. The best way to tap this potential is to invest in a collective vehicle specialising in Europe, with strong expertise in selecting and monitoring the top European managers. However, access to these funds often remains limited to a select circle, as they are frequently closed to new investors.

Notably, the GRANOLAS (Europe’s equivalent of America’s “Magnificent Seven”) have started to underperform the Stoxx 600 since early April, creating greater dispersion and a more favorable environment for selecting long and short positions. With Europe once again facing geopolitical tensions and the persistent risk of deglobalisation, it might just be time to reconsider European long/short strategies.

Peak pod shop – Where to next?

Over the last four years we have published several pieces about multi-manager platforms (commonly referred to as pod shops) highlighting “the good, the bad and the ugly”. In each of the last four years we have witnessed over a dozen new launches, and this year is no exception. They all claim to be in niche strategies that eventually become victims of their success and soon face the inevitable growing pains of scaling up followed by diluted returns as they grow their assets too rapidly. Very few have survived the test of time and remained successful despite their phenomenal growth in assets. One could argue that the largest pod shops today all started with a much smaller base and performed way better in their beginnings.

Reuters recently reported that 38.3% of the entire hedge fund industry’s returns over the past three years were generated by Citadel, Millennium and D.E. Shaw, which represent only 4.6% of the industry’s entire assets under management. As the three have been around for 25 years and each have around $60 bio under management, this is quite a remarkable achievement. Add Point 72 (formerly SAC Capital) to the mix and you have the largest pod-shop juggernauts in the world (Ex DE Shaw) representing 42% of the entire pool of pod shops.

Over the last two years there have been several papers published by various prime brokers about pod shops and they all highlight the fact that the larger the pod shop and the larger the passthrough structure, the better they perform. Hence this month’s chart, which illustrates their average performance in 2023 and the impact of fees (“the ugly”) eating into gross performance. The industry has increasingly been confronted with a never-ending game of musical chairs as the war for acquiring talent continues unabated. As a result, pod shops are getting overly expensive thanks to the pass-through structure and yet clients are happy to pay as they are yet to suffer from significant drawdowns (bar a few exceptions in 2008) single hedge fund managers face at some point in their career. At NS Partners we have obviously benefitted from them, as our low volatility mandate has achieved an annualized return of 5% (net of fees) with a volatility of under 2% over the last 3 years. This is essentially what pension funds needed during a zero-interest rate environment but now that cash yields the same, the bogey has changed. Now the time has arrived for the next evolution of our low volatility mandate which we had initially overhauled back in the summer of 2020.

So where do we go from here as not all pod shops are created equal. Talent is scarce and not scalable which enables the smaller pod shops to generate superior returns (as long as they intend to stay small and hence uninteresting for the large pension funds/endowments). Like single manager hedge funds, size and leverage can become your biggest enemy exposing you to left tail events, especially in a sudden deleveraging environment following a market shock or liquidity event. With a footprint of 30% of US equities in 2023 according to Goldman Sachs, this makes them larger than that of the traditional single manager equity L/S funds. The footprint is even larger in terms of headcount where it is estimated that they account for over a quarter of the industry’s headcount (the 3 largest pod shops alone have over 12,000 employees). The biggest risk is a flash crash or August 2007 type of forced unwind that ripples across all the pod shops that have built-in circuit breakers (strict stop loss policies). Given the amount of leverage involved this could potentially have a huge impact in terms of musical chairs but as in August 2007, ironically the last one standing (or sitting out the storm) turned out to be the winner!

Perhaps the more interesting model today is a smaller and more concentrated version with seasoned external managers that run their own boutiques and have no interest in being hired by a pod shop but contribute and get paid for their ideas like a traditional alpha capture model. The difference here is that the focus is not on the batting average of a PM (that then gets levered up in a traditional pod shop to produce decent returns) but on the slugging ratio i.e. how good they are at successful versus losing trades. Add to the mix a central trading layer to hedge out factor risks as opposed to having a hard and fast stop loss rule irrespective of the investment thesis et voila! Let’s face it, most single managers have been caught off guard on numerous occasions in the last few years by severe factor rotations which could be blamed on the quants or the deleveraging effect of crowded trades among the pods. This obviously applies to equity long short strategies where most of the pod shops have their roots but so far it has been interesting to see quite spectacular results from tier 2 and even more so from the tier 3 pod shops. Let’s hope they can continue to deliver double-digit returns without growing exponentially (and maintain competitive fees!).

Pod shop fees don’t come cheap these days and long gone are the days when our friend George Soros annualized at 33% net over 30 years (if you could stomach the volatility) with a 1% management fee and a 15% performance fee…

Past performance is not indicative of future results. The views, strategies and financial instruments described in this document may not be suitable for all investors. Opinions expressed are current opinions as of date(s) appearing in this material only. References to market or composite indices, benchmarks or other measures of relative market performance over a specified period of time are provided for your information only. NS Partners provides no warranty and makes no representation of any kind whatsoever regarding the accuracy and completeness of any data, including financial market data, quotes, research notes or other financial instrument referred to in this document. This document does not constitute an offer or solicitation to any person in any jurisdiction in which such offer or solicitation is not authorized or to any person to whom it would be unlawful to make such offer or solicitation. Any reference in this document to specific securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be interpreted as recommendations to purchase or sell those securities. References in this document to investment funds that have not been registered with the FINMA cannot be distributed in or from Switzerland except to certain categories of eligible investors. Some of the entities of the NS Partners Group or its clients may hold a position in the financial instruments of any issuer discussed herein, or act as advisor to any such issuer. Additional information is available on request.
© NS Partners Group

Chart of the Month – Building the perfect mousetrap for capturing alpha

Chart of the Summer – Building the perfect mousetrap for capturing alpha

Hedge fund performance overall has been disappointing this year with the HFRX Global Hedge Fund Index barely turning positive YTD as of the end of June. With your typical Balanced 60/40 portfolio up just under 10% YTD (BUT still underwater over the last 2 years!) and cash rates above 5%, hedge funds are facing a big challenge this year as the bogey has changed in the last 9 months. This year has clearly been a year for more directional equity long short managers and less so for market neutral given how narrowly led the market has been (and not only in the US with its Magnificent Seven). In addition to the lack of breadth in the market, the bi-polar factor rotation and sector re-positioning (chronic over the last few years) has caught many managers off guard (blame it on the quant funds – mostly stat arb).

Building a longstanding legacy that is built to last with a clear succession plan to compound returns with consistency over time is more challenging for investment managers that become victims of their success than it is for consumer brands, with the inevitable style drift that comes with a successful track record, as they take in more assets than they can manage, which is the ultimate nail on the coffin. The alternative: the multi-PM model which offers decentralized portfolio management with no single risk-taker able to rock the boat, combined with centralized risk management and the ability to scale in size (to a certain point) where investment opportunities arise. This model has been around since the end of the 1980s and has proved itself over time in compounding consistent returns beyond traditional benchmark indices. This month’s chart compares the Barclays Multimanager Index of 42 multi-PM platforms versus the HFRX Global Hedge Fund Index and highlights why this model has been so successful with investors (mostly pension funds, sovereign wealth funds and private banks). It should be of no surprise that most of the growth in the $4 Trio. hedge fund industry over the last few years has been in the multi-PM space given their ability in providing consistent risk-adjusted performance and more importantly their capacity to protect capital during market drawdowns in comparison to multi-strategy funds led by a single PM that sooner or later stumble and fall before re-jigging their strategy. Their capability in identifying talent and allocating capital efficiently across various strategies has proved itself to a point where the competition for talent has reached extremes and has become a game of musical chairs. Poaching traders between multi-PM platforms has now become like paying for star football players (which does not necessarily guarantee the success of a team, but who cares, if they can score big on their own). The success of the multi-PM platform model can be further illustrated by the number of PMs that have left some of the oldest and most successful platforms over the last 25 years following a so-called stellar track record but then fail to deliver when they launch on their own. There are countless examples of these which attest to the robustness in the construct of the multi-PM platform.

The significant rise in the risk-free rate of late has somewhat challenged a platform’s ability to generate a high Sharpe ratio in addition to the subpar performance as traditional sub-strategy buckets are not working as well YTD. The most common allocations by sub-strategy within a multi-PM structure and the reason for their underperformance YTD are: Fundamental Equity Long Short (market neutral strategies are going through one of the worst years due to massive short squeezes), Discretionary Macro (tough year to call the direction of rates unless you focus on EM), Merger Arbitrage (less deals as money is no longer cheap and the regulator has taken a tougher stance), Capital Markets (the IPO/SPAC market has dried up and not many new deals) and Systematic Macro (tough year to catch trends and have completely missed the equity market rally). What has worked this year has been Global Credit, Fixed Income RV, Convertibles and unsurprisingly Commodities (where most multi-PM platforms are less exposed). Quant strategies have had mixed results but are an inherent part of the build as a diversifier of alpha sources but often plagued by “love / hate” relationships until they get thrown out and replaced down the line with a new team if they underperform over time. They are, however, better able to perform during periods of market volatility given their shorter-term time horizon.

One could say that there are way too many hedge funds today (more than the 16,041 Starbucks stores in the US alone!) fishing in the same pond for the most part i.e. the US equity market where the number of listed companies has drastically fallen from over 8,000 companies (at its peak in 1996) down to 3,700 today (thanks to private equity groups or bankruptcies). You have the same number of stocks listed in Japan today so go figure why there are barely any hedge funds left trading out of Tokyo (the capital of equity market neutral strategies)! Finding 50 of the best capacity constrained sector PMs is easy but getting 250 is more difficult with the inherent risk of diworsification. The big question today is whether the multitude of multi-PM platforms are arbitraging themselves out. The fact that they have increasing amounts of capital under management, which must be deployed across the same popular sectors and in liquid stocks, have all ended up trading the same equity names. In addition, the average holding period of a stock in the US is down to 10 months down from 5 years back in the 70s. Not surprising that we occasionally see a platform winding down a sector or sub-strategy pod which has breached its risk limits and has had to liquidate, creating a ripple effect across other multi-PM platforms which in turn are forced by their risk control teams to cut risk. The inherent leverage used within these platforms (which varies widely amongst them) to enable them to increase alpha only amplifies the ripple effect.

The big dilemma for platforms today is whether to onboard managers to have exclusivity (which comes at a price and with no performance guarantee) or work with outside independent managers and/or the sell-side. External Alpha-capture programs were first pioneered by Marshall Wace back in 2001 (initially started as a summer internship project) to enable buy-side firms to track and analyze the sell-side’s best ideas. At the time the average lifespan of a contributor was and still is around 4-5 years. Compared to the average lifespan of a PM within one of the oldest multi-pm structures today, it is now down to 17 months (Darwinism!). Perhaps the platforms concentrated down to 20-30 PMs (like the traditional fund of funds model) will do better but their capacity will be constrained. We will always be reminded that size is your biggest enemy. With at least ten new platforms slated to launch this year, the trend is far from over.

Ultimately, it is more of an art than a science and as one manager told me back in the 90s “we all use the same ingredients but it’s the recipe that makes the difference…”

Past performance is not indicative of future results. The views, strategies and financial instruments described in this document may not be suitable for all investors. Opinions expressed are current opinions as of date(s) appearing in this material only. References to market or composite indices, benchmarks or other measures of relative market performance over a specified period of time are provided for your information only. NS Partners provides no warranty and makes no representation of any kind whatsoever regarding the accuracy and completeness of any data, including financial market data, quotes, research notes or other financial instrument referred to in this document. This document does not constitute an offer or solicitation to any person in any jurisdiction in which such offer or solicitation is not authorized or to any person to whom it would be unlawful to make such offer or solicitation. Any reference in this document to specific securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be interpreted as recommendations to purchase or sell those securities. References in this document to investment funds that have not been registered with the FINMA cannot be distributed in or from Switzerland except to certain categories of eligible investors. Some of the entities of the NS Partners Group or its clients may hold a position in the financial instruments of any issuer discussed herein, or act as advisor to any such issuer. Additional information is available on request.
© NS Partners Group

Gráfico del mes – Burgernomics: el amargo sabor de la inflación

Burgernomics: el amargo sabor de la inflación

El índice Big Mac fue inventado por la revista The Economist en 1986 como una «Guía de la inflación para tontos» 19 años después de la creación del Big Mac en 1967 con un precio de 45 céntimos en aquel entonces (hoy cuesta algo más de 6 dólares, un 1,244% más). Eso sucedió justo diez años después de que McDonald’s inaugurase su primera franquicia en Suiza (en Ginebra, el 4 de noviembre de 1976; entonces el Big Mac tenía un precio de 3,90 francos suizos y ahora vale 6,90). El índice pretendía ser una forma divertida de ilustrar el concepto de paridad del poder adquisitivo junto con la inflación del precio de una hamburguesa emblemática reconocida universalmente, sinónimo de la cultura estadounidense y que emplea los mismos ingredientes en todo el mundo. Las variantes locales, como la McRaclette (olvídense del cheddar procesado) o la McBollywood (sin carne de vacuno, por favor) eran las raras excepciones. No hace falta decir tiene que todo lo que tiene que freírse, hornearse o cocinarse se ha disparado de precio en los últimos doce meses.

Como aspecto menos positivo, no hay más que ver el espectacular aumento y caída del poder adquisitivo en EE. UU. (¡atentos a la próxima gran revolución que viene!). En 1980, con el salario mínimo en EE. UU. se podían comprar algo más de seis Big Macs, mientras que en 2022 apenas permite comprar uno (¡teniendo en cuenta los impuestos estatales y municipales!).

	1967	1980	2023
Salario mínimo	1,40 USD	3,10 USD	7,25 USD
Precio medio del Big Mac	0,45 USD	0,50 USD	6,05 USD
Big Macs por hora	3,10	6,20	1,20

Todavía me deja perplejo cómo McDonald’s pudo distribuir con semejante éxito su equivalente del Ford Modelo T fabricado en serie (una gama de productos idéntica en todo el mundo). Y no, las mejores hamburguesas no se encuentran necesariamente en Estados Unidos (¡se sorprenderían!). No alcanzo a entender las razones por las que alguien compraría algo que tiene más azúcar, grasas, sal y ácidos grasos saturados que hidratos de carbono, pero ha sobrevivido a la prueba del tiempo y ha acabado con muchos competidores desde su creación en 1955 en California (irónicamente, el estado que se ha convertido en uno de los más sanos y en forma de América). El caso de este grupo de comida rápida que más vende en el mundo y el de mayor éxito en restauración fue objeto de estudio en la Harvard Business School hace 20 años y salió indemne de la reciente pandemia, gracias a sus McAuto®, respetando la distancia social. Desde que empezó a cotizar en bolsa el 21 de abril de 1965, una sola acción comprada a 22,50 dólares valdría ahora nada más y nada menos que 1.201.625 dólares (excluyendo los dividendos, pero teniendo en cuenta los desdoblamientos de acciones).

Además de su valor lúdico, el índice Big Mac tiene sus defectos: la mayor parte del continente africano está fuera del menú, como lo está también Rusia desde el año pasado, al igual que Bielorrusia (por problemas en la cadena de suministro: escasez de patatas fritas). El crecimiento del PIB y los costes laborales son diferentes en todo el mundo (a menudo son reflejo del salario mínimo local) y un artículo no es indicativo de la cesta de la compra habitual que representa el coste de la vida. Sin embargo, sí que refleja el precio de las materias primas, el coste de la mano de obra y la electricidad. También existe una versión del gráfico ajustada al PIB, que modifica algo las estadísticas.

Estar fuera de la zona euro parece tener sus ventajas: países como Suiza, Noruega y Suecia están siempre en la parte más alta de la clasificación. Sin embargo, las últimas clasificaciones muestran que Turquía, Egipto e incluso Gran Bretaña se han desplomado en la clasificación desde el pasado mes de junio, siendo superados por países como Venezuela (que en su día lideró la clasificación, superando tanto a Noruega como a Suiza en 2013). El denominador común es la inflación, que ha afectado mucho más a estos países de forma (Venezuela importa la mayor parte de los alimentos que consume), lo que ha llevado a sus bancos centrales a endurecer la política monetaria con mayor contundencia.

Compren sus Big Mac en bitcoin en algunos lugares del mundo, como El Salvador (e incluso en algunas ciudades de Suiza) ¡y la volatilidad de sus precios se dispara! Y si creía que en Japón no había inflación, McDonald’s ha elevado el precio de su hamburguesa clásica tres veces en menos de un año (un 55%) debido al aumento de los costes y a las fluctuaciones de divisas, pues ¡la inflación acaba de marcar su nivel más alto en 40 años! Resulta paradójico que, a medida que suben los precios de los alimentos, disminuye el número de cenas fuera de casa, lo que beneficia a McDonald’s.

Estén atentos a la próxima publicación del Índice Big Mac dentro de seis meses y prepárense para más sobresaltos. McDonald’s acaba de publicar sus resultados del cuarto trimestre, que han batido las expectativas tanto de ingresos como de beneficios, a pesar de la fortaleza del dólar estadounidense (el grupo genera más ingresos fuera de EE. UU., por lo que hay que prestar atención a la caída del dólar desde finales del año pasado, que mejoraría los datos del próximo trimestre). Un crecimiento de las ventas de dos dígitos en todos los segmentos no está mal en el entorno actual, cuando se tiene cierto poder de fijación de precios.

Cabe esperar que las cosas vayan a peor, con los abundantes cuellos de botella en las cadenas de suministro en todo el mundo debido a la guerra en Ucrania y la inusual triple caída de La Niña (el efecto contrario de El Niño), por tercer año consecutivo, que ha afectado a los cultivos en todo el mundo con sequía extrema, lluvias y huracanes. Todo esto genera el mayor número de oportunidades de toda una generación para los gestores discrecionales macro y de arbitraje, además del fin del prolongado entorno de tipos de interés cero al normalizarse los tipos.

¡Ojalá se pudiera arbitrar el diferencial de un Big Mac…!

Los resultados pasados no implican resultados futuros. Las opiniones, estrategias e instrumentos financieros que se describen en el presente documento pueden no ser convenientes para todos los inversores. Las opiniones expresadas son sólo las del momento en la(s) fecha(s) que aparece(n) en este material. Las referencias a índices de mercado o compuestos, índices de referencia u otras medidas de resultados relativos de los mercados durante un período específico sólo se proveen a título informativo. NS Partners no garantiza ni es responsable de la exactitud o la integridad de las informaciones (datos financieros de mercado, precios de bolsa, resultados de investigación u otros instrumentos financieros) que se mencionan en este documento. El presente documento no constituye una oferta ni solicitud a ninguna persona ni jurisdicción donde tal oferta o solicitud no esté autorizada ni a ninguna persona a quien sería ilegal hacer dicha oferta o solicitud. Toda referencia en este documento a instrumentos específicos o a emisores sólo tiene una finalidad ilustrativa y no debe ser interpretada como una recomendación para la compra o venta de dicho instrumento. Las referencias en este documento a fondos de inversión se aplican a fondos que no han sido registrados por la Finma y que por lo tanto no pueden ser distribuidos en o desde suiza excepto a ciertas categorías de inversores. Algunas de las empresas del grupo NS Partners o sus clientes pueden tener posiciones en los instrumentos financieros de alguno de los emisores mencionados en este documento, o ser asesor de uno de ellos. Hay información adicional disponible a solicitud.

Graphique du mois – L’économie du burger: le goût amer de l’inflation

L’économie du burger: le goût amer de l’inflation

L’indice Big Mac, sorte de «Guide de l’inflation pour les nuls» a été inventé par The Economist en 1986, soit dix-neuf ans après la création du Big Mac en 1967. Celui-ci était alors vendu au prix de 45 cents (aujourd’hui il coûte un peu plus de 6 dollars, soit une hausse de 1 244%). C’était exactement dix ans après que McDonalds ait inauguré sa première franchise en Suisse (à Genève, le 4 novembre 1976 – à l’époque, le Big Mac coûtait 3,90 CHF et il vaut aujourd’hui 6,90 CHF). L’indice se proposait d’illustrer de manière ludique le concept de parité de pouvoir d’achat ainsi que l’inflation à travers le prix de l’emblématique burger, universellement reconnu, synonyme de culture américaine et utilisant les mêmes ingrédients dans le monde entier. Les variantes locales comme le McRaclette (on oublie le cheddar transformé) ou le McBollywood (sans bœuf, s’il vous plaît) étaient les rares exceptions. Aujourd’hui, il va sans dire que tout ce qui doit être frit, cuit ou cuisiné a vu son prix augmenter de manière significative au cours des 12 derniers mois.

Sur une note moins réjouissante, on ne peut que constater la hausse et la baisse spectaculaires du pouvoir d’achat aux États-Unis (surveillez cette zone pour la grande révolution à venir!). En 1980, avec le salaire minimum aux États-Unis, on pouvait acheter un peu plus de 6 Big Macs, alors qu’en 2022, on pouvait à peine en acheter un (sans oublier les taxes d’État et municipales)!

	1967	1980	2023
Salaire minimum	1,40$	3,10$	7,25$
Prix moy. du Big Mac	0,45$	0,50$	6,05$
Nb de Big Mac/heure	3,10	6,20	1,20

Comment McDonald’s a pu distribuer avec autant de succès son équivalent de la Ford T produite en série (une gamme de produits identiques dans le monde entier) me laisse perplexe. Notons au passage que contrairement à ce que l’on pourrait croire, les meilleurs burgers ne sont pas forcément américains! On se demande donc ce qui peut bien pousser les gens à acheter un produit qui contient plus de sucre, de graisse, de sel et d’acides gras saturés que de glucides? Pourtant, depuis sa création en 1955 en Californie (qui paradoxalement est désormais l’un des États les plus sains et les plus en forme d’Amérique), ce produit a résisté à l’épreuve du temps et a poussé de nombreux concurrents à la faillite. Groupe de restauration rapide le plus vendu au monde et groupe de restauration le plus prospère, il a fait l’objet d’une étude de cas à la Harvard Business School il y a 20 ans et, distanciation sociale oblige, la société a traversé la récente pandémie sans encombre grâce à ses McDrive®. Depuis son introduction en bourse le 21 avril 1965, une seule action achetée à 22,50 dollars vaudrait aujourd’hui 1 201 625 dollars (hors dividendes mais en tenant compte des fractionnements d’actions)!

Au-delà de sa valeur ludique, l’indice Big Mac présente certains défauts, comme l’absence au menu de la majeure partie du continent africain, de la Russie depuis l’année dernière et du Belarus (pour des questions de chaîne d’approvisionnement – pénurie de frites). De plus, la croissance du PIB et le coût de la main-d’œuvre (qui reflète souvent le salaire minimum local) diffèrent d’un pays à l’autre et une unité n’est pas forcément représentative du panier de consommation typique qui reflète le coût de la vie. En revanche, il reflète bien le prix des matières premières, le coût de la main-d’œuvre et celui de l’électricité. L’indice existe aussi dans une version corrigée du PIB, ce qui modifie quelque peu les statistiques.

Le fait de ne pas faire partie de la zone euro semble avoir ses avantages, puisque des pays comme la Suisse, la Norvège et la Suède se situent systématiquement en tête du classement. Par contre, les derniers chiffres montrent que la Turquie, l’Égypte et même la Grande-Bretagne ont brusquement dégringolé dans le classement depuis juin dernier, pour n’être battues à la baisse que par des pays comme le Venezuela – qui, pourtant, une fois, en 2013, était arrivé en tête du classement, devant la Norvège et la Suisse! Le dénominateur commun de ces pays est l’inflation qui les a frappés plus durement, incitant leurs banques centrales à resserrer leurs politiques de manière plus agressive (on notera que le Venezuela importe la plupart des denrées alimentaires qu’il consomme).

Si, comme vous pouvez le faire dans certains endroits du monde comme le Salvador (et même dans certaines villes de Suisse), vous achetez votre Big Mac en bitcoins, alors la volatilité des prix bat tous les records! Et pour ceux qui pensaient qu’il n’y avait pas d’inflation au Japon, sachez que McDonalds a augmenté le prix de son burger classique trois fois en moins d’un an (+55%) en raison de la hausse des coûts et des fluctuations de la monnaie, l’inflation ayant récemment atteint son niveau le plus élevé en quarante ans! L’ironie du sort veut qu’à mesure que les prix des denrées alimentaires augmentent, la restauration hors foyer diminue, au profit de McDonald’s.

Restez attentifs à la prochaine publication de l’indice Big Mac dans six mois et préparez-vous à un choc des prix encore plus important! McDonalds vient de publier ses résultats du quatrième trimestre, qui, malgré la force du dollar américain, ont dépassé les attentes, tant sur le plan des bénéfices que sur celui de la rentabilité (le groupe génère davantage de chiffre d’affaires hors des États-Unis, ainsi, avec la baisse du dollar depuis la fin de l’année dernière, les chiffres du prochain trimestre devraient s’améliorer). Dans le contexte actuel, une croissance à deux chiffres des ventes dans tous les segments est assez appréciable lorsque l’on dispose d’un certain pouvoir de fixation des prix.

Or, compte tenu des goulets d’étranglement des chaînes d’approvisionnement qui se multiplient dans le monde entier en raison de la guerre en Ukraine et de La Niña (phénomène inverse d’El Niño) qui réalise un rare triplé (trois années consécutives) et affecte les récoltes dans le monde entier en provoquant des sécheresses, des précipitations et des ouragans extrêmes, on peut s’attendre à ce que la situation se dégrade. Cette conjoncture crée l’un des plus grands ensembles d’opportunités de toute une vie pour les gérants de stratégies discrétionnaires macro et d’arbitrage, sans compter la fin de l’environnement prolongé de taux d’intérêt nuls avec la normalisation des taux.

Que ne pouvons-nous arbitrer le spread d’un Big Mac…!

Les performances passées ne garantissent pas les résultats futurs. Les opinions, stratégies et instruments financiers décrits dans le présent document peuvent ne pas convenir à tous les investisseurs. Les opinions énoncées sont celles valables à la date de publication de ce document. Toute référence aux indices de marches ou composites, indices de référence, ou autres mesures de performance relative des marches a une certaine période sont indiquées à titre d’information. NS Partners ne donne aucune garantie et n’est aucunement responsable de l’exactitude et de l’exhaustivité de l’ensemble des informations (données financières de marche, cours de bourse, avis de recherche ou description de tout autre instrument financier) contenus dans ce document. Le présent document n’est pas destiné aux personnes ou entités qui seraient citoyennes ou résidentes d’un lieu, état, pays ou juridiction dans lesquels sa distribution, sa publication, sa mise à disposition ou son utilisation seraient contraires aux lois ou règlements en vigueur. Les informations et données fournies dans le présent document sont communiquées à titre indicatif uniquement et ne constituent ni une offre, ni une incitation à acheter, vendre ou souscrire a des titres ou tout autre instrument financier. Il est fait référence dans ce document a des fonds d’investissement qui n’ont pas été enregistrés auprès de la Finma et ne peuvent donc pas être distribues en ou depuis la suisse sauf à certaines catégories d’investisseurs éligibles. Certaines des sociétés du groupe NS Partners ou ses clients peuvent être détenteurs d’une position dans les instruments financiers de l’un des émetteurs mentionnes dans ce document, ou agir en tant que consultant pour l’un d’eux. Des informations supplémentaires sont disponibles sur demande.

Chart of the Month – Burgernomics – A bitter taste of inflation

Burgernomics – A bitter taste of inflation

The Big Mac Index was invented by The Economist back in 1986 as a “Guide to Inflation for Dummies” nineteen years following the creation of the Big Mac in 1967 and priced at 45c at the time. (today it will cost just over $6 – up 1,244%). This was exactly ten years after McDonalds had inaugurated its first franchise in Switzerland (in Geneva on November 4th, 1976 – at the time the Big Mac was priced at CHF 3.90 and now worth CHF 6.90). The index was intended to be a cheerful way of illustrating the concept of purchasing power parity together with inflation in the price of a universally recognized iconic burger synonymous with American culture and using the same ingredients globally. Local variants like the McRaclette (forget the processed Cheddar) or the McBollywood (without the beef please) were the rare exceptions. Needless to say, that anything that has to be fried, baked or cooked has seen its priced jacked up by a significant amount in the last 12 months.

On a less brighter note, one can only witness the spectacular rise and fall of purchasing power in the US (watch this space for the next big revolution to come!). In 1980 minimum wage in the US could buy you just over 6 Big Macs whereas in 2022 it could barely buy you one (don’t forget state and city taxes)!

	1967	1980	2023
Minimum Wage	$1.40	$3.10	$7.25
Big Mac Avg. Price	$0.45	$0.50	$6.05
Big Macs per hour	3.10	6.20	1.20

How McDonalds was able to distribute their equivalent of the mass-produced Ford Model T (an identical product range across the globe) so successfully still baffles me. And no, the best burgers are not necessarily found in America (you would be surprised!). Why one would buy something that has more sugar, fat, salt and saturated fatty acids than carbohydrates is a mystery to me, but it has survived the test of time and put many peers out of business since its creation in 1955 in California (ironically the state that has become one of the healthiest and fittest state in America). As the world’s top selling fast food group and most successful restaurant group, it became a Harvard Business School case study 20 years ago and survived the recent pandemic unscathed, thanks to its McDrive® drive-ins, social distancing oblige. Since it’s IPO on April 21st 1965, a single share bought at $22.50 would be now worth a whopping $1,201,625 (excluding dividends but taking to account stock splits)!

Besides its entertainment value, The Big Mac index does have its flaws; most of the African continent is off the menu and Russia is also off the menu since last year as is Belarus (for supply chain issues – scarcity of French fries). GDP growth and labor costs differ across the world (often reflecting the local minimum wage) and one item is not reflective of your typical consumer basket that represents the cost of living. However, it does reflect the price of raw materials, cost of labor and electricity. There is also a GDP adjusted version of the chart which changes the stats somewhat.

Being outside the Euro area appears to have its advantages with the likes of Switzerland, Norway and Sweden consistently on top of the rankings. However, the latest rankings show that Turkey, Egypt and even Britain have fallen precipitously in the rankings since last June only to be beaten downwards by the likes of Venezuela (that once topped the charts beating both Norway and Switzerland back in 2013!). The common denominator is inflation that hit these countries more significantly (Venezuela actually imports most of the food they eat) prompting their central banks to tighten more aggressively.

Buy your Big Mac in Bitcoin in some places around the world like El Salvador (and even some cities in Switzerland) and your price volatility goes off the charts! And if you thought there was no inflation in Japan, McDonalds has hiked the price of the classic burger three times in less than a year (+55%) on surging costs and currency fluctuations as inflation has just hit its highest level in forty years! Ironically as food prices rise, wining & dining out will be on the decline benefitting McDonalds.

Stay tuned for the next release of the Big Mac Index in six months and be prepared for more sticker shock! McDonalds just reported its Q4 earnings which beat expectations on both the top and bottom lines despite the strength of the US dollar (the group generates more revenue outside the US so watch the fall in the USD since the end of last year which would improve the numbers for the next quarter). Double-digit sales growth in all segments is not bad in today’s environment when you have some pricing power.

With bottlenecks in supply chains abundant throughout the world thanks to the war in Ukraine and La Niña (the opposite effect of El Niño) doing a rare triple dip (for the third year in a row) and affecting crops across the globe through extreme drought, rainfall and hurricanes, one can expect things to get worse. All this creates one of the greatest opportunity sets in a lifetime for discretionary macro and arbitrage managers in addition to the end of the prolonged zero interest rate environment as rates normalize.

If only one could arbitrage the spread of a Big Mac…!

Past performance is not indicative of future results. The views, strategies and financial instruments described in this document may not be suitable for all investors. Opinions expressed are current opinions as of date(s) appearing in this material only. References to market or composite indices, benchmarks or other measures of relative market performance over a specified period of time are provided for your information only. NS Partners provides no warranty and makes no representation of any kind whatsoever regarding the accuracy and completeness of any data, including financial market data, quotes, research notes or other financial instrument referred to in this document. This document does not constitute an offer or solicitation to any person in any jurisdiction in which such offer or solicitation is not authorized or to any person to whom it would be unlawful to make such offer or solicitation. Any reference in this document to specific securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be interpreted as recommendations to purchase or sell those securities. References in this document to investment funds that have not been registered with the FINMA cannot be distributed in or from Switzerland except to certain categories of eligible investors. Some of the entities of the NS Partners Group or its clients may hold a position in the financial instruments of any issuer discussed herein, or act as advisor to any such issuer. Additional information is available on request.
© NS Partners Group

Chart of the Month – Nowhere to run, nowhere to hide

Chart of the month – Nowhere to run, nowhere to hide

chart of the month Those of you that have aged well will remember the Billboard Hot 100 single “Nowhere to Run” by Martha Reeves & The Vandellas which was released in 1965 by Motown and copied & remixed by many such as The Isley Brothers, Laura Nyro, Michael Bolton and The Commitments (for you younger folks out there). At the time the 60% equities / 40% bonds (“balanced”) portfolio had already been around for over 10 years, invented by Nobel prize winner Harry Markowitz. The classic 60/40 portfolio has delivered an annualized return of 4.54% over the last 28 years with a Sharpe of 0.44. Fast forward to today and the conventional model which has been so successful historically has suddenly been turned on its head and questioned as the benchmark index was down 14.4% YTD as of mid-May! This is the worst synchronized decline for equity and fixed income benchmarks in history. So, have hedge funds finally earned their place at the dinner table? Not the case this year for most of the successful equity long short names in the industry, irrespective of their geographical focus.

Exactly two years ago, we wrote a piece titled “Survival of the Fittest” which was to be the blueprint for the enhancement of our multi-strategy low volatility mandate which had been running for over 20 years. A year later we wrote the sequel “In Pursuit of Looking Sharpe” after having implemented the changes outlined in our blueprint by adding a number of multi-PM platforms to the portfolio. In summary, the success of the multi-PM model is predicated on their ability of imposing strict stop-loss guardrails in order to prevent drawdowns in addition to being the most efficient allocators of capital to differentiated sources of alpha. Furthermore, multi-PM platforms are increasingly working with external managers enabling them to outperform their peers and produce higher Sharpe ratios (in addition to avoiding high acquisition costs associated with the traditional turf wars between the larger funds). Fast forward to today and as they say “the proof is in the pudding” following two years of live track record in the enhanced mandate. And thus, we truly have an all-weather approach as an alternative to fixed income that enables you to sleep well at night without having to worry about the extreme intra-day moves we have been witnessing of late.

This month’s chart illustrates the sum of all the monthly drawdowns of the MSCI World Index over the last 2 years stacked up against the returns of our multi-strategy low volatility mandate during the same periods. So far, we are pleased with the live crash-test results with a spread of 33.75%, thus making it a viable “alternative” to traditional portfolios. This year Value, Growth and Momentum have been the biggest driver of single stock volatility (and unfortunately Quality has become correlated to Momentum recently) with many of the largest and most successful managers in the equity long / short space witnessing their largest drawdowns of their investment careers. In striking contrast, the equity long / short managers within the multi-PM platforms have been able to perform well due their factor awareness (if not factor neutrality in some cases) together with their low net market exposure.

Remember this famous quote: Crises take much longer to arrive than you believe and they happen much faster than you thought they could (the late Rudi Dornbusch – the economist who graduated from the University of Geneva)!

Past performance is not indicative of future results. The views, strategies and financial instruments described in this document may not be suitable for all investors. Opinions expressed are current opinions as of date(s) appearing in this material only. References to market or composite indices, benchmarks or other measures of relative market performance over a specified period of time are provided for your information only. NS Partners provides no warranty and makes no representation of any kind whatsoever regarding the accuracy and completeness of any data, including financial market data, quotes, research notes or other financial instrument referred to in this document. This document does not constitute an offer or solicitation to any person in any jurisdiction in which such offer or solicitation is not authorized or to any person to whom it would be unlawful to make such offer or solicitation. Any reference in this document to specific securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only, and should not be interpreted as recommendations to purchase or sell those securities. References in this document to investment funds that have not been registered with the FINMA cannot be distributed in or from Switzerland except to certain categories of eligible investors. Some of the entities of the NS Partners Group or its clients may hold a position in the financial instruments of any issuer discussed herein, or act as advisor to any such issuer. Additional information is available on request.

Protected: NS Webinar – Pendulum – An all weather alternative.